It makes no sense. Even an rookie soldier would tell you that you dont open your strategic moves by playing your biggest card. It defies common sense.
So what prompted China to challenge India in Doklam? Why open an Eastern front with India this early in the process? Why surrender the element of surprise?
A 'preemptive strike' seems like the only explanation.
A docile Indian response for 40+ years has bred a sense of sanguine overconfidence within the Chinese establishment. Recent reports suggests China has usurped 2000 sq km of Indian territory over the past few decades.
A micro, local version of the 'salami slice' doctrine has been implemented by China.
It follows a now familiar pattern:
1. Call an area 'disputed'
2. Claim said area and call for talks for a 'peaceful' resolution
3. Confront border forces and occupy small areas within 'disputed' area
4. Gauge rival's response. Is response 'muted', feeble? Continue occupying area and build semi-permanent structures
5. Repeat cycle
Successive Indian governments have preferred an ostrich like approach to China's expansionist ambitions. An approach which has conditioned the Chinese into fashioning their tactics with a docile, subservient India as a starting point.
This week's Doklam incident must be seen in this light.
But a broader chess game is underway.
As described here http://inflextionpoint.blogspot.com/2017/06/the-approaching-war-india-vs-pakistan.html
India is preparing to attack Pakistan with a clear objective: Take and hold POK.
Pakistan's severely weakened economy, dependence on American military hardware and international isolation has given India a near perfect window to act now.
China's CPEC program has injected a sense of urgency into India's plans. India faces a 'now-or-never' moment vis-a-vis the Sino-Pak axis.
Even a limited war with India in POK would severely damage CPEC. More importantly even if India fails to achieve all its objectives, a declared war would open the door for India to establish CPEC as an encroachment on Indian territorial sovereignty and impose a program to permanently cripple it through cross border bombings, Water Wars, etc.
Moreover, the consequent rise in cost of protecting CPEC would make it bottomless pit and scare away prospective investors.
China understands these factors. What is baffling though it its willingness to open its counter moves with the biggest strategic card in the deck i.e. opening a second front on India's eastern border with China.
Couple this incursion with the 'downed' Sukhoi jet on Indo-China earlier this month and we can draw the following conclusions: China wants to buy time and prevent the aforementioned attack on POK.
Perhaps the Chinese expected the usual muted response from India and were hoping to scare India into paralysis on the Western front.
If not permanently, than long enough to allow China to build out their CPEC highway/railway network in POK and allow for a large contingent of PLA to be stationed there and become the defacto border force to defend against Indian aggression.
Some reports have suggested that 10,000 Chinese troops are already stationed in POK. But against overwhelming odds (India has 100,000 troops in Kashmir alone) China needs to buy more time.
By escalating the Doklam incident, Indian strategist has played their cards well. A larger escalation would draw international attention. With Bhutan siding with India, China risks reinforcing its image as an international bully. Smaller states along OBOR will get the message - You could be the next victim in China's hegemonistic designs.
Actions taken by India over the past 3 years suggests that Indian military has prepared for a two front war. India's long border with China will allow it to counter Chinese incursions in one area with their own incursions along other parts of the border. Defending such a long border would raise costs for China.
The best China can hope for is an uneasy stalemate.
These factors help explain China's somewhat haphazard opening gambit.
The question is how far are they willing to take this.
One last point. CPEC is more than a strategic 'string of pearls' project for China. It is a OBOR demonstrator program. Its failure would severely dent Chinese attempts to replicate it in other parts of the world.
CPEC's importance within OBOR suggests China will prevent Pakistan's use of Nukes (tactical or conventional) in the battlefield. Indian counters would permanently destroy China's ability to gain a control over Af-Pak.
CPEC may have (at least partly) crippled Pakistan's nuclear blackmail.
So what prompted China to challenge India in Doklam? Why open an Eastern front with India this early in the process? Why surrender the element of surprise?
A 'preemptive strike' seems like the only explanation.
A docile Indian response for 40+ years has bred a sense of sanguine overconfidence within the Chinese establishment. Recent reports suggests China has usurped 2000 sq km of Indian territory over the past few decades.
A micro, local version of the 'salami slice' doctrine has been implemented by China.
It follows a now familiar pattern:
1. Call an area 'disputed'
2. Claim said area and call for talks for a 'peaceful' resolution
3. Confront border forces and occupy small areas within 'disputed' area
4. Gauge rival's response. Is response 'muted', feeble? Continue occupying area and build semi-permanent structures
5. Repeat cycle
Successive Indian governments have preferred an ostrich like approach to China's expansionist ambitions. An approach which has conditioned the Chinese into fashioning their tactics with a docile, subservient India as a starting point.
This week's Doklam incident must be seen in this light.
But a broader chess game is underway.
As described here http://inflextionpoint.blogspot.com/2017/06/the-approaching-war-india-vs-pakistan.html
India is preparing to attack Pakistan with a clear objective: Take and hold POK.
Pakistan's severely weakened economy, dependence on American military hardware and international isolation has given India a near perfect window to act now.
China's CPEC program has injected a sense of urgency into India's plans. India faces a 'now-or-never' moment vis-a-vis the Sino-Pak axis.
Even a limited war with India in POK would severely damage CPEC. More importantly even if India fails to achieve all its objectives, a declared war would open the door for India to establish CPEC as an encroachment on Indian territorial sovereignty and impose a program to permanently cripple it through cross border bombings, Water Wars, etc.
Moreover, the consequent rise in cost of protecting CPEC would make it bottomless pit and scare away prospective investors.
China understands these factors. What is baffling though it its willingness to open its counter moves with the biggest strategic card in the deck i.e. opening a second front on India's eastern border with China.
Couple this incursion with the 'downed' Sukhoi jet on Indo-China earlier this month and we can draw the following conclusions: China wants to buy time and prevent the aforementioned attack on POK.
Perhaps the Chinese expected the usual muted response from India and were hoping to scare India into paralysis on the Western front.
If not permanently, than long enough to allow China to build out their CPEC highway/railway network in POK and allow for a large contingent of PLA to be stationed there and become the defacto border force to defend against Indian aggression.
Some reports have suggested that 10,000 Chinese troops are already stationed in POK. But against overwhelming odds (India has 100,000 troops in Kashmir alone) China needs to buy more time.
By escalating the Doklam incident, Indian strategist has played their cards well. A larger escalation would draw international attention. With Bhutan siding with India, China risks reinforcing its image as an international bully. Smaller states along OBOR will get the message - You could be the next victim in China's hegemonistic designs.
Actions taken by India over the past 3 years suggests that Indian military has prepared for a two front war. India's long border with China will allow it to counter Chinese incursions in one area with their own incursions along other parts of the border. Defending such a long border would raise costs for China.
The best China can hope for is an uneasy stalemate.
These factors help explain China's somewhat haphazard opening gambit.
The question is how far are they willing to take this.
One last point. CPEC is more than a strategic 'string of pearls' project for China. It is a OBOR demonstrator program. Its failure would severely dent Chinese attempts to replicate it in other parts of the world.
CPEC's importance within OBOR suggests China will prevent Pakistan's use of Nukes (tactical or conventional) in the battlefield. Indian counters would permanently destroy China's ability to gain a control over Af-Pak.
CPEC may have (at least partly) crippled Pakistan's nuclear blackmail.
